We examine whether litigation risk encourages or deters real earnings management (REM). On the one hand, the literature argues that litigation risk restricts opportunism in voluntary disclosure and financial reporting choices. This can encourage REM, as managers seek to substitute strategic disclosure and reporting with more opaque and difficult-to-detect earnings management via real actions. On the other hand, REM's more negative implications for future stock price and operating performance documented in the literature suggest that shareholders should be motivated to identify and litigate instances of REM upon observing negative outcomes. This ex post settling-up opportunity for shareholders can ex ante deter managers from engaging in REM. We conduct difference-in-difference tests centered on an unanticipated court ruling that reduced shareholders' ability to initiate class action lawsuits against firms headquartered in the Ninth Circuit. We observe significant increases in REM following the ruling for Ninth Circuit firms relative to other firms. Further, these increases are more pronounced when managers are more entrenched and when firms have lower institutional ownership. We conclude that the threat of litigation deters REM, especially when other mechanisms such as corporate governance and monitoring are weaker.
Introduction
Our goal is to examine whether litigation risk encourages or deters real earnings management. Security class action litigation enables shareholders to sue a firm for issuing misleading financial reports and/or disclosures (Skinner 1994, Francis Philbrick and Schipper 1994) . The threat of litigation can, in turn, discipline managers' voluntary disclosure practices as well as financial reporting choices.
1 Importantly, managers can attempt to mislead investors not just via guidance and reporting choices but also by altering underlying real transactions (Bruns and Merchant 1990; Graham, Harvey and Rajgopal 2005) . In fact, executives often prefer this method of managing earnings because it is more opaque and thus more difficult for investors to detect and litigate (Kothari, Mizik and Roychowdhury 2016) .
A concern in this context is that higher litigation risk can motivate managers to simply substitute earnings management via real activities for that via accruals (see Cohen Dey and Lys 2008) . 2 However, real earnings management (REM) hardly exists in a vacuum. Managers have to potentially justify any short-term actions undertaken to boost earnings but detrimental for long-term value to the investing community and to financial analysists. This may induce them to misrepresent their actions and issue misleading statements that in turn become subject to lawsuits. Further, REM is even more negatively associated with future firm performance than accruals management (Cohen and Zarowin 2010; Kothari et al. 2016 ).
Shareholders seeking recompense for negative outcomes consequently have incentives to identify real actions that misled them and destroyed value. Thus, high threat of litigation can conceivably deter managers from engaging in real earnings management.
1 See, for example, Skinner (1994), Field Lowry and Shu (2005) , Houston, Lin, Liu, and Wei (2015) , Hopkins (2014) , Cazier, Christensen, Merkley and Treu (2017) . 2 Cohen et al. (2008) document firms substituted accruals management with more difficult-to-detect real earnings management after the Sarbanes and Oxley Act in 2002, which strengthened regulatory oversight over financial reporting.
REM encompasses a wide variety of activities with adverse consequences that can be subject to litigation. For example, overproduction to spread out fixed costs and understate cost of goods sold typically inflates current-period earnings but also results in excess inventory. Larger inventories often lead to companies booking losses in the future because of increased obsolescence risk. Upon observing such losses, shareholders can accuse managers of overstating earnings at the expense of long-term value. Furthermore, as in the case of the 2012 class-action lawsuit against General Motors (hereafter GM), shareholders may also allege that managers engaged in overproduction to mislead investors into forming inflated expectations of future demand and revenue.
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Another example involves "channel stuffing", or aggressively shipping inventories to intermediate dealers without supporting retail demand in order to book sales. Indeed, channel stuffing was included among the security class action allegations against GM. Channel stuffing can lead investors to form inflated expectations of future demand and can involve offering price discounts to dealers that they come to expect even in future periods, reducing long-term margins (Roychowdhury 2006) . Similarly, an aggressive (and opportunistic) reduction of discretionary expenses can be misinterpreted as having a persistent positive influence on earnings, when in fact these reductions are detrimental for a company's longterm competitiveness (Cohen and Zarowin 2010 , Kothari et al 2016 , Vorst 2016 . For example, the securities class action lawsuit against Hospira Inc. in 2011 accused the company of compromising crucial quality control procedures with the objective of reporting lower remediation costs and higher margins. The lawsuit alleged that by the time the FDA detected the quality control deficiencies, product quality had suffered, sales had declined, and the delayed remediation had become significantly more costly. In summary, there are several counts on which shareholders can point to REM's role in overstating the company's operating performance and financial health, and damaging the value of their claims in the process. While there is no systematic evidence linking REM to litigation against managers and directors, Kim and Park (2014) find that REM at client firms is positively associated with auditors' legal exposure.
Studying the effect of litigation on earnings management is generally challenging because of intrinsic endogeneity. If firms more likely to engage in REM are more susceptible to litigation, this would manifest as a positive association between REM and litigation likelihood. However this positive relation does not necessarily imply that litigation risk encourages managers to engage in REM (Skinner 1997; Field et al. 2005; Houston et al. 2015; Hopkins 2014) .
To address endogeneity, we study changes in real earnings management following an exogenous shock to the stringency of securities class action litigation standards for firms located in the U. The majority of lawsuits are litigated where the firms' headquarters are located (Cox, Thomas and Bai, 2009 ). The Ninth Circuit includes the following states: Alaska, Arizona, California, Hawaii, Idaho, Montana, Nevada, Oregon, and Washington. According to Johnson et al (1999) , commenting on the 1999 ruling, "…the Ninth Circuit's interpretation in Silicon Graphics is the most stringent, requiring plaintiffs to allege facts that would show the defendants were "deliberately reckless" in making the misrepresentation that gave rise to the fraud claim…" 5 Relatedly, the ruling was unlikely to reflect the prevailing or evolving economic conditions, given the surprise it generated. Rather, it was much more likely to be driven by the ideologies of the ruling judges. The Ninth Circuit randomly selects three judges to adjudicate such cases (Hopkins 2014). In the case of Silicon Graphics, two conservative judges were selected, and they voted against the plaintiffs. The liberal-leaning third judge dissented, voting in favor of the plaintiffs.
Crane and Koch (2016) and Houston et al. (2015) demonstrate that after the ruling the number of class action lawsuits filed in the Ninth Circuit decreased significantly relative to other jurisdictions. In further support of a reduction in litigation risk, we find that a measure of litigation risk introduced by Kim and Skinner (2012) decreased significantly after the ruling for firms located in the Ninth Circuit relative to those located in other circuits. Since the shock affected only firms located in the states that belong to the Ninth Circuit, we are able to compare their post-ruling changes in REM to those of firms located in states belonging to other circuits in differences-in-differences tests.
Using a sample of firm-years which spans four years before and four years after the 1999 ruling, we find significant post-ruling increases in REM for the firms headquartered in the Ninth Circuit relative to the firms located in other circuits. 6 Our results indicate that limiting shareholders' ability to file class action lawsuits increased managers' propensity to engage in REM in firms located in the Ninth Circuit, consistent with litigation deterring, rather than encouraging, REM. The results are not driven by unobserved firm characteristics since our regressions include firm fixed effects. We also rule out the concern that our results are driven by systematic differences in firm characteristics or economic conditions in the Ninth Circuit and other court circuits. In particular, we repeat our tests restricting our sample to propensity-score-matched control and treatment firms. In another test, we limit our sample to firms in adjacent counties on each side of the state border between a Ninth Circuit and a non-Ninth-Circuit state. We obtain similar results with both analyses. Our inferences are further robust to the inclusion of industry-year fixed effects which control for differential industry trends which may arise if the industry composition of the Ninth Circuit firms and firms located in other circuits differs systematically.
To rule out the possibility that our results are driven by the collapse of the technology bubble in years 2000-2002, we exclude technology firms and firms in industries that had negative cumulative abnormal returns over the three-year period. 7 We continue to obtain the same results. Additionally, we confirm that there are no trending differences in REM between the Ninth Circuit firms and firms located in other circuits before the court ruling. We thus find robust evidence that class action litigation deters real earnings management.
We expect that if litigation indeed deters REM then this deterrence effect should be more crucial in firms with poorer governance. Accordingly, we next examine whether the post-ruling increases in REM are more pronounced for firms with poor corporate governance.
In our tests, we focus on institutional ownership and managerial entrenchment as measures of governance. Prior literature points to institutional investors' monitoring role in general and with respect to REM in particular (Bushee 1998; Roychowdhury 2006) . Such investors are sophisticated and thus well equipped to detect REM. They are also known to influence managerial actions via either voice or the threat of exit and do not rely solely on litigation (Parrino, Sias and Starks 2003; Edmans 2009; Edmans and Manso 2011) . Given the negative consequences of REM for future growth and firm value, institutional investors are likely to discourage these actions. Consequently, we predict that the post-ruling increases in REM are greater for Ninth Circuit firms with lower institutional ownership. Our second governance measure, managerial entrenchment, reflects circumstances in which monitoring by the board of directors, shareholders and other parties is generally less effective, enabling managers to purse actions that best serve their own interests (Bebchuk, Cohen, and Ferrell 2009 While managers are expected to exercise their discretion in real activities to generate earnings for their firms, an enduring concern has been that they sometimes do so at the expense of long-term value by engaging in opportunistic real earnings management. Not surprisingly, the literature has been interested in factors that constrain REM. Research to date has focused on various aspects of the firm's governance: the appropriate design of the executive compensation package (Chen et al. 2015) , the checks and balances within a firm, that is, internal corporate governance (Cheng et al. 2016) , and the monitoring role of longterm institutional investors (Bushee 1998; Roychowdhury 2006 (Cohen et al. 2008) . In this context, our evidence is particularly valuable because it indicates that the threat of litigation makes it difficult for managers to substitute opportunistic real actions for misleading disclosure and accrual choices.
Setting and hypotheses
Securities Class Action Litigation offers shareholders the opportunity to form a class and hold managers and directors responsible in court for violating SEC rules via actions including accounting fraud, insider trading and providing misleading information on firm performance. Until 1995, class action lawsuits relied on the "fraud on the market" theory.
This theory, adopted by many courts in the mid-seventies, did not require plaintiffs to prove that managers issued misleading information or were responsible for material omissions, because all public information was presumably reflected in the stock price. A large stock price drop was thus synonymous with corrective revelations and sufficient to trigger litigation (Skinner 1994; Francis, et al. 1994 (Johnson, Nelson and Pritchard 1999; Grundfest and Pritchard 2002) . According to the ruling, to form a class, the plaintiffs in the Ninth Circuit are required to show that the defendants acted with "deliberate recklessness", rather than mere "recklessness" which is sufficient in other circuits. 8 The Ninth Circuit ruling introduced a particularly high burden of proof given that evidence of intent is usually obtained only in discovery, after a class has been formed. Empirical evidence indicates that the ruling significantly reduced the incidence 8 Re: Silicon Graphics Inc. Securities Litigation, 183 F.3d 970 (9 th Cir. 1999) involved an allegation that managers engaged in insider trading after issuing misleading statements to hype the stock price. The case was dismissed on the premise that stock sales coupled with negative internal performance news are insufficient to prove that managers' actions were deliberate. The ruling was unexpected and likely reflected the beliefs of the judges randomly selected from the pool and appointed to this particular case (Hopkins 2014 were to file lawsuits against the firm in various locations, legal panels consolidate these lawsuits and relocate them to the district with the easiest access to documents and witnesses, i.e., a firm's headquarters (Cox, Thomas and Bai 2009; Hopkins 2014; Houston et al. 2015) .
Overall, the Ninth Circuit court ruling Re: Silicon Graphics Inc. unexpectedly and exogenously reduced litigation risk for firms headquartered in that circuit, providing an ideal setting for our tests of litigation's disciplining effect on real earnings management.
In a related study, Hopkins (2014) In summary, we test the following null hypothesis:
Hypothesis 1 (null): Real earnings management (REM) in firms headquartered in the Ninth
Circuit did not change after the 1999 ruling.
Sample
We begin our sample selection process by obtaining data on all publicly listed firms from the Compustat/CRSP database with non-missing information on historical headquarters over the period 1995-2002. 12 Our tests compare a pre-ruling period: four years preceding the Ninth Circuit court ruling (1995) (1996) (1997) (1998) , and a post-ruling period: four years beginning in the year of the ruling (1999) (2000) (2001) (2002) . We restrict our analyses to four years before and four years after the ruling to limit concerns about the potential effect of confounding events over longer horizons.
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The sample excludes firms in financial industries (sic 6000-6999) and utilities (sic 4000-4999), as well as penny stocks (firms with stock price smaller than $1). We next require the availability of COMPUSTAT and CRSP data necessary to construct our control variables:
ROA, total assets, firm age, dividends, capital expenditures, leverage, cash, debt issues, and repurchases. We also control for institutional ownership and assume zero institutional ownership when the firm is not included in Thomson Financial 13F files. We winsorize all continuous variables at the 1 st and 99 th percentile every year. All variables are defined in Appendix A.
In our tests, we use the maximum number of observations we can obtain after requiring the dependent variable as well as the partitioning variable for that test. For example, our main analysis of the ruling's effect on abnormal discretionary expenses of the Ninth
Circuit firms relative to non-Ninth Circuit firms includes 5,493 firms and 20,706 firm-year observations between 1995 and 2002. We classify a firm as treated (or a "Ninth Circuit" firm) 12 To determine the relevant court circuit, we use the firm's historical headquarters at the time of the ruling obtained from 10-K filings from Edgar online. The historical headquarters are not available from COMPUSTAT, which backfills the data and instead reports the current headquarters for all firm-years in the database. 13 Using an alternative window of three years before and after 1999 that is 1996-2001, does not materially influence our results. All our ensuing discussion is thus based on the window of four years before and after 1999.
if its headquarters are located in one of the states subject to the Ninth Circuit Court. 14 The remaining firms are classified as "controls".
Empirical Analysis

Research Design and Variable Definition
Our multivariate tests employ a differences-in-differences research design in which we compare the changes in REM following the 1999 ruling for treated firms (firms headquartered in states located in the Ninth Circuit or "Ninth Circuit" firms) to the corresponding changes for control firms (firms headquartered outside of the Ninth Circuit).
We estimate the following difference-in-difference regression specification: 
DiscExp is discretionary expenses (the sum of advertising expenses, R&D expenses and SG&A expenses) and Prod is production costs (the sum of the cost of goods sold and the change in inventory). In order for all measures to be consistent and increase in the level of earnings management, Abndisx is given by the residual from equation (2) Abnprod than it is for Abndisx as a consequence of data availability (19,194 versus 20,706) .
Descriptive Statistics
The intersection of observations with sufficient data to compute both measures and to 15 We do not use abnormal cash flow from operations (CFO) because different methods of real earnings management can have opposite effects on CFO (Roychowdhury, 2006) . construct our aggregate measure RM includes 19,177 firm-years. The exclusion of penny stocks and the data requirements for computing earnings management proxies leads to slightly larger and more profitable firms in our sample relative to the COMPUSTAT population. The median firm in our sample has an ROA of 13.0%, market capitalization of $154 million and institutional ownership of 29.2%. Table 2 provides some preliminary insights into the differences-in-differences in REM in a univariate setting. The table reports 
Results on changes in real earnings management
In this section we examine in multivariate tests whether the Ninth Circuit court ruling and the resulting decrease in litigation risk led to any significant changes in the firms'
propensity to engage in REM. In particular, we estimate equation (1) We next perform a number of robustness tests on these multivariate results. We begin by conducting a parallel-trends analysis. This analysis helps us establish if the relative changes in REM we document are present only after the ruling or, to the contrary, they precede the ruling. If changes in REM precede the ruling, they are attributable to trending differences between the Ninth Circuit firms and the firms headquartered in other circuits and do not result from the ruling itself. Table 4 reports the results of this parallel-trends analysis.
We find no trending differences between the Ninth Circuit and other circuit firms before the To further assure that the composition of firms is similar in the subsamples of the Ninth-Circuit and non-Ninth-Circuit firms on dimensions other than just industry membership, we construct a propensity score matched sample of treatment and control firms.
Specifically, we limit our sample to the Ninth-Circuit and non-Ninth-Circuit firm-years that are propensity score matched using the following characteristics: industry membership, ROA, size, dividends, capital expenditures, leverage, cash holdings, net debt issuance, stock repurchases and institutional ownership. Table 6 , Panel A shows the mean values of firm characteristics for the Ninth-Circuit and non-Ninth-Circuit firms in this propensity score 16 We also perform a robustness test using 40 miles as an alternative distance from the Ninth Circuit state border. Even though the sample size is reduced significantly, the coefficients on Post*Ninth Circuit are significant and positive in all three specifications with different measures of real earnings management as dependent variables.
matched sample, as well as p-values from t-tests of differences. The matching is successful, yielding no significant differences in the overall propensity matching score or any of the firm characteristics. 
Results on the role of managerial entrenchment and institutional ownership
The evidence till this point robustly indicates that REM is lower in the presence of higher litigation risk, implying that litigation deters REM. In this section, we investigate cross-sectional variation in litigation's deterrence effect on REM. We predict that litigation's deterrence role is particularly crucial in firms with poor corporate governance. Several aspects of corporate governance have been shown to mitigate REM including ownership by sophisticated shareholders, structure of compensation contracts, and internal balance of power (Bushee 1998; Roychowdhury 2006; Chen, Cheng, Lo, and Wang 2015; Cheng, Lee and Shevlin 2016) . We expect that the opportunity for ex post settling-up that litigation provides is likely to be a more valuable deterrent when governance is weaker and less effective in restraining managers from engaging in REM. The post-ruling decline in litigation risk thus implies that any increase in REM at Ninth Circuit firms is likely to be more pronounced among firms with weaker corporate governance. We focus on two aspects of governance: managerial entrenchment and institutional ownership. Greater managerial entrenchment implies weaker governance, as both the board of directors and the market for corporate control find it more difficult to discipline entrenched managers (Bebchuk et al. 2009 ). This provides entrenched managers incentives to extract wealth from shareholders via various actions, including earnings management. We thus expect litigation's deterrence effect on REM to be more pronounced in firms with more entrenched managers. Turning to our second measure of governance, institutional owners are sophisticated investors who are likely to monitor managers' real choices more closely, and discourage actions that are detrimental for long-term value. Among firms with low institutional ownership, the lack of this external monitoring by shareholders makes it easier for managers to inflate current earnings myopically via REM (Bushee 1998; Roychowdhury 2006) . We thus expect litigation's deterrence effect on REM to be more pronounced in firms with lower institutional ownership.
Empirically, we expect the decline in litigation risk after the court ruling to lead to greater increases in REM among firms with more entrenched managers and firms with lower institutional ownership. We first investigate whether post-ruling increases in REM at the Ninth Circuit firms relative to non-Ninth-Circuit firms are particularly acute when managers are more entrenched. As in Bebchuk, Cohen, and Ferrell (2009) , we use the entrenchment index (E-Index) to capture managerial entrenchment. E-Index is based on six provisions, four of which constitute limitations on shareholders' voting power and the remaining two are measures against hostile takeovers. To conduct this test, we augment equation (1) is negative and significant in all three columns, indicating that the post-ruling increases in REM at the Ninth Circuit firms are stronger when institutional ownership is lower.
Results on real earnings management to report abnormal ROA
We next combine our measures of real earnings management with indicators for firmyears in which return on assets (ROA) is abnormally high, to ensure that we are indeed capturing managerial attempts to overstate earnings via real transactions (Kothari et al. 2016 ).
Following Kothari et al. (2016) , we estimate abnormal ROA as the residual from the following fixed-effect first-order autoregressive model:
where ROA i,t is operating income over lagged total asset; ROA i,t-1 is its lagged value; Assets i,t-1 is lagged total assets.
For every REM measure, we create a corresponding indicator variable equal to one when both abnormal ROA and the REM measure are greater than zero. This process yields three new binary variables (AbnROA_Abndisx, AbnROA_Abnprod, and AbnROA_RM). Using these variables as alternative dependent variables, we re-estimate our main, as well as crosssectional, specifications. 
Derivative lawsuits and real earnings management
In our final set of analyses, we examine another shock to the ability of shareholders to file lawsuits which involves derivative, rather than securities class action, litigation. The purpose of this analysis is to increase the generalizability of our results. Unlike the Ninth Circuit Court ruling, the shock to the filing of derivative lawsuits was staggered over time, which addresses potential concerns that the deterrence effect of litigation on REM is limited to one specific time-period or event.
Most accounting research to date has focused on securities class action lawsuits, likely because this type of litigation results mostly from violations of disclosure, financial reporting and insider trading regulations, and provides shareholders with an opportunity to 17 We include industry fixed effects in place of firm fixed effects in the logit model to avoid the incidental parameters problem (Wooldridge 2010), which can result in inconsistent coefficients in logit models with panel data because of a high number of "nuisance" parameters as the number of unique observations increases. When we estimate an OLS regression with firm fixed effects in place of industry fixed effects, we obtain similar results.
recover damages, making these lawsuits very common (Skinner 1994; Field, Lowry and Shu 2005) . Derivative lawsuits allow shareholders to sue managers and/or directors on behalf of the corporation (rather than on behalf of shareholders') for a breach of fiduciary duty. As documented by Ferris, Jandik, Lawless and Makhija (2007), these lawsuits are filed for a variety of reasons, including violating the duty of care (41%), duty of loyalty (26%), mishandling corporate information (16%), and concerns about mergers and acquisitions (7%).
Plaintiffs almost always prefer securities class action litigation but derivative lawsuits are often filed in addition to class action lawsuits whenever there are legal grounds for initiating both types of litigation (Erickson, 2010; Appel 2016) .
Derivative lawsuits involve some procedural hurdles, including the "demand shareholders seek the board's approval before initiating litigation (Appel 2016) . Appel (2016) shows that the filing of derivative lawsuits decreased significantly and corporate governance became weaker after the passage of UD laws for firms incorporated in states that adopted those laws (UD states) relative to firms in states that did not adopt the laws as of that year.
Moreover, Houston, Lin and Xie (2015) document that cost of capital increased for firms in UD states following the passage of these laws, and Bourveou, Lou and Wang (2014) find that free of litigation concerns, managers started to issue more optimistic management forecasts.
Overall, prior evidence indicates that the passage of UD laws reduced the incidence and the deterrence effect of litigation.
In this section, we examine the effect of a reduction in the deterrence effect of derivative lawsuits on real earnings management. The main benefit of this test is that the adoption of UD laws was staggered across time and across states. As a result, this analysis is a good complement to our main tests in which we study a shock that affected one group of firms at one particular point in time and compare it to firms that were not affected by the shock.
To perform this analysis we create a sample of firm years encompassing years 1985-2009, which ranges from 4 years before the first state adoption of UD laws to four years after the last state adoption. 18 We replace Post*Ninth Circuit in equation (1) with an indicator variable Post(UD)*UD which takes the value of 1 for firm-years incorporated in a state that passed UD laws after the passage of the laws. 19 As in our previous tests, we include firm and year fixed effects which absorb separate indicator variables for firms incorporated in the states that passed UD laws and for the period following the passage of the laws by a particular state. We cluster standard errors at state of incorporation level. Table 8 reports the results from this specification. Because our sample for this analysis begins in 1985, certain state level control variables are not available. We thus present our results on a large sample of firm-years without state controls (columns (1) through (3)), and for the subsample of firm- 18 The years of individual state adoptions are as follows: GA and MI in 1989 , FL in 1990 , WI in 1991 , MT, VA, UT in 1992 , NH and MS in 1993 , NC in 1995 , AZ and NE in 1996 , CT, ME, PA, TX, WY in 1997 , ID in 1998 , HI in 2001 , IA in 2003 , MA in 2004 , RI and SD in 2005 In these tests we use historical state of incorporation obtained from 10-K filings from Edgar online. Our sample excludes firms that switched states of incorporation, penny stocks and firms in regulated industries.
years with state controls available (columns (3) through (6)). 20 The coefficient on POST(UD)*UD is significant and positive in all six columns, pointing to significant increases in REM for firms incorporated in states adopting UD laws relative to those for firms incorporated in other states. Consistent with our main results based on securities class action litigation, we conclude that litigation serves a deterrence role with respect to real earnings management and that REM increases when that role is reduced.
Conclusion
Shareholders can pursue various courses of action to prevent managers from violating their fiduciary duty and engaging in actions that transfer wealth away from shareholders. In this paper, we provide evidence that litigation serves an important deterrence role with respect to real earnings management. Using an exogenous shock that increased the difficulty of filing lawsuits in the Ninth Circuit Court, we find that real earnings management increased significantly after the ruling for the firms located in the Ninth Circuit relative to firms headquartered in other states and thus not subject to the shock. We find that these increases were particularly pronounced at firms with weaker corporate governance: when managers were more entrenched and institutional ownership was lower. Our results are robust to various alternative explanations and extend to another shock to the stringency of litigation -the passage of universal demand laws that increased the difficulty of filing derivative lawsuits. Together our results suggest that litigation aids corporate governance in deterring real earnings management. The ex post opportunity for settling up that litigation provides and its deterrence effect on REM is particularly valuable in firms that lack mechanisms such as corporate governance and monitoring by sophisticated shareholders that would ex ante constrain such activities. Percentage of people vote for Democrat at last presidential election.
Abndisx
Following Kothari et al (2016), we estimate abnormal discretionary expenditures with a fixed-effect first-order autoregressive model:
Where DiscExp i,t is the sum of advertising expenses, R&D expenses and SG&A expenses, all scaled by lagged total assets; DiscExp i,t-1 is its lagged value; Assets i,t-1 is lagged total assets; Sales i,t is sales during the year scaled by lagged total assets.
To control for year-specific and firm-specific effects that induce model misspecification, we employ the model proposed by Kothari et al (2016) . In their words: "First, every firm's discretionary expenditure is differenced from the cross-sectional mean for that year. Second, for every firm, the annual deviation of discretionary expenditure from the cross-sectional mean is differenced from the corresponding deviation in the previous year. The explanatory variables in the model are also differenced twice in the same manner." The model is estimated every year. The firm-year residual minus the mean value of the residual across all years for the corresponding firm, times minus one, yields abnormal discretionary expense or Abndisx for that firm-year. Higher values of Abndisx represent greater cuts in discretionary expenses and more earnings management." Following Kothari et al (2016) , we estimate abnormal production cost with a fixed-effect first-order autoregressive model:
Abnprod
Prod i,t = α 0 + α 1 Prod i,t-1 +α 2 1 / Assets i,t-1 + α 3 Sales i,t + α 4 ∆Sales i,t + α 5 ∆Sales i,t-1 + ε i,t Where Prod i,t is the sum of COGS and change in inventory during the year scaled by lagged total assets; Prod i,t-1 is its lagged value; Assets i,t-1 is lagged total assets; Sales i,t is sales during the year scaled by lagged total assets; ∆Sales i,t is the sale growth scaled by lagged total assets; ∆Sales i,t-1 is its lagged value.
To control for year-specific and firm-specific effects that induce model misspecification, we employ the model proposed by Kothari et al. (2016) and described in the definition for Abndisx but using production cost (instead of discretionary expenses) as the starting point. The model is estimated every year. The firm-year residual minus the mean value of the residual across all years for the corresponding firm yields abnormal production expense or Abnprod for that firm-year. To control for year-specific and firm-specific effects that induce model misspecification, we employ the model proposed by Kothari et al. (2016) and described in the definition for Abndisx but using ROA (instead of discretionary expenses) as the starting point. The model is then estimated every year. The firm-year residual minus the mean value of the residual across all years for the corresponding firm yields abnormal ROA for that firm-year.
Abndisx_Beat
Indicator equal to one if a firm's Abn ROA>0 and Abndisx is above zero, and zero otherwise.
Abnprod_Beat
Indicator equal to one if a firm's Abn ROA>0 and Abnprod is above zero, and zero otherwise.
RM_Beat
Indicator equal to one if a firm's Abn ROA>0 and RM is above zero, and zero otherwise.
E-Index
Indicator equal to one if firms' Entrenchment index is above median and zero otherwise.
D(t=-2)
Indicator equal to one if the year is 1997 and zero otherwise.
D(t=-1)
Indicator equal to one if the year is 1998 and zero otherwise.
D(t=0)
Indicator equal to one if the year is 1999 and zero otherwise.
D(t=1)
Indicator equal to one if the year is 2000 and zero otherwise.
D(t>=2)
Indicator equal to one if the year is 2001 onwards and zero otherwise.
UD
Indicator variable for a "UD state"; that is, equal to one if a state eventually passes UD law for a firm in that state, and zero otherwise.
Post(UD)
Indicator variable for the post-UD-law-passage-period for a UD state; that is, equal to one for the period after the UD state passes UD law for a firm in that state, and zero otherwise. 
Table 3 Earnings Management
The sample period is from 1995 to 2002 (4 years around the year of the Ninth Circuit court ruling). We exclude the financial and utility industries (sic 4000-4999 and sic 6000-6999). We exclude penny stocks (share price less than one dollar) and firms with missing state of headquarter location. All variables are defined in Appendix A. T-statistics are presented beneath the coefficients within parentheses. *, ** and *** denote two-tailed significance level at 10%, 5% and 1% respectively. Standard errors are corrected for heteroscedasticity and are clustered at state of location level.
(1) Table 8 Meet and Beat
The sample period is from 1995 to 2002 (4 years around the year of the Ninth Circuit court ruling). We exclude the financial and utility industries (sic 4000-4999 and sic 6000-6999). We exclude penny stocks (share price less than one dollar) and firms with missing state of headquarter location. All regressions contain same set of control variables as per The sample period is from 1985 to 2009 (4 years around first and last year of the UD ruling). We exclude the financial and utility industries (sic 4000-4999 and sic 6000-6999). We exclude penny stocks (share price less than one dollar) and firms with missing state of incorporation. All variables are defined in Appendix A. T-statistics are presented beneath the coefficients within parentheses. *, ** and *** denote two-tailed significance level at 10%, 5% and 1% respectively. Standard errors are corrected for heteroscedasticity and are clustered at state of incorporation level.
(1) 
